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1 Introduction 
It is well recognised in industrial organisation theory and its empirical literature that 
learning as a capability is a major factor in explaining inter-firm performance differences. 
The success of newly industrialised countries (NICs), for example, has shown that 
technological progress is not merely guided by changes in relative prices; nor does 
competitiveness depend upon relative factor endowments. Industrial development is 
about more than acquiring technological blue prints, and involves a learning process, not 
least in the context of late comers to industrialisation where governments have actively 
pursued industrial regulation and protection to allow firms to grow and learn to compete. 
How then does regulation impact upon firm learning and growth? This paper analyses the 
role played by government policies in transforming the learning abilities of firms and 
markets with reference to the Indian automobile industry. 
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Drawing on a case study analysis of automotive firms in the Indian industry, three 
hypotheses are developed relating firm learning to policy regime. These hypotheses are 
then empirically tested using a panel data of 13 firms across a 38 year period, an interval 
subdivided into three different industrial policy regimes eras: protection, deregulation and 
liberalisation. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant learning literature. 
Section 3 outlines successive industrial policy regimes, and explores their learning 
impact. Section 4 explains the econometric model to be applied, followed by empirical 
estimation and presentation of results. Finally, Section 5 discusses the main contributions 
of the paper and gives conclusions. 
2 Literature review 
A rich body of literature exists on different types of firm learning and its role in firms’ 
performance. Traditional expositions focus on industry-specific variables to capture the 
extent of innovation, proxied by (for example) R&D expenditure or number of patents. 
However, differences in inter-firm performances are not captured because firms are 
modelled in terms of a production function, with any inter-firm differences arising purely 
out of productivity changes. But in reality, differences in inter-firm performances exist 
because of the presence of information asymmetries, distributed knowledge, and 
differential capabilities, all of which in turn give rise to different learning processes 
within firms.1 
Various types of learning processes have been identified in the literature – learning by 
doing, learning through acquisition of internal resources, learning through spillovers, 
learning through innovations, learning by exporting, and last but not least, learning and 
forgetting. 
• Learning by doing: Here, learning curves relate unit costs to accumulated production 
volumes, affecting future costs and market position. The traditional method of 
estimating the learning curve is to estimate the relationship between input use and 
cumulative output, whereby input units decline with accumulated output. Spence 
(1981) models the implications of learning curves on entry, market shares and 
profitability, finding that industries with very slow or very fast learning have lower 
entry barriers, with more competition. From a regulatory perspective, enforcing 
competition in industries with moderate learning might then reduce technical 
efficiency. 
• Learning by innovation: Learning by innovation posits a relationship between 
growth of the firm and the proxy variables chosen as indicators of innovation. For 
instance, Grilliches (1979) uses a production function approach to analyse returns to 
R&D expenditures, highlighting the measurement issues relating to the stock of 
R&D capital, and modelling output as a function of inputs, the current state of 
technical knowledge, and other (unmeasured) determinants. It is recognised that 
present technical knowledge is a function of current as well as past levels of research 
and development expenditure. 
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• Learning through internal resources: Another important source of firm learning is 
absorptive capacity, which consists of a set of capabilities that reflect the ability of a 
firm to learn. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) distinguish between two types of 
capability: learning capability and problem solving capability. Although the 
processes are similar, what is learnt in the two cases is different: learning capabilities 
involve a capacity to assimilate existing knowledge, and problem solving a capacity 
to create new knowledge (ibid, p.130). There are also constraints on the speed of 
knowledge accumulation, similar to ‘Penrose effects’ [see Geroski and Mazzucato, 
(2002), p.630]. The growth of the firm then depends not only on the firm’s ability to 
assimilate existing knowledge but also on the speed with which it can accumulate 
new knowledge. 
• Learning and forgetting: According to the learning and forgetting hypothesis, in 
addition to learning firms can also experience organisational forgetting – the 
hypothesis that the firm’s production experience depreciates over time – with 
incomplete spillovers of production expertise from one generation of product to the 
next. Lanier (2000) develops this proposition in the context of a study focused on 
development in the aircraft industry. 
• Learning and industrial policy regime: A crucial factor which influences learning 
costs is the nature of the industrial policy regime. From an infant industry 
perspective, which can be traced back at least as far as List (1856), a government 
policy of protection may enable learning and capability acquisition by firms over a 
period of time. Essentially a dynamic theory of comparative advantage, it argues for 
national protection for some countries. However, such a policy also increases 
dynamic transaction costs (DTCs), by increasing coordination and administration 
costs, through regulatory controls in the industrialisation process of developing 
countries. 
For example, the license Raj system implemented in India in the 1950s, to redirect 
investment towards the state, constrained private sector investment: but activities like 
monitoring, negotiation and lobbying redirected productive assets to unproductive uses 
(see Bardhan, 1984; Ahluwalia, 1985). When government controls relax and economies 
liberalise, coordination costs decline making it favourable for firm and market 
capabilities to develop. For example, when in the 1990s government awarded licenses for 
broad groups of automotive products (‘broad-banding’), this meant that automotive firms 
could exploit economies of scale and scope to diversify product ranges from commercial 
vehicles to cars. This move allowed firms to take advantage of their core capabilities in 
manufacturing and outsource non-core capabilities to the market. 
Geroski and Mazzucato (2002), analysing the impact of policy regimes on learning in 
the US automobile industry, also classify learning into various categories. According to 
the authors, while learning is not directly observable, the process of learning is 
observable and can be modelled as an unsystematic stochastic process – along the lines of 
Gibrat’s law2 which models firm growth as a stochastic process, independent of size. This 
process can be revealed by the time path of output, which indicates whether growth rate 
differences are explained by a systematic learning process. They find that learning was 
mostly unsystematic (stochastic) in the post-WW2 period of liberalisation, as opposed to 
the pre-war period. They treat unsystematic learning as indicative of learning and 
forgetting in periods of rapid change. 
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In the Indian context, a number of studies have been done on the effect of industrial 
policy regimes on growth and capability acquisition by firms.3 In all of the studies, the 
Indian automobile industry is broadly characterised by three industrial policy regimes: 
protection, deregulation and liberalisation. Each regime is marked by a specific 
macroeconomic environment, market structure and technology, and external institutions. 
Narayanan (1998) finds that inter-firm growth differences and asymmetry in technology 
acquisition is largely due to firms’ ability to bring about technological paradigm and 
trajectory shifts in the post-deregulation period. However, none of these studies 
specifically address learning processes within firms as a determinant of inter-firm 
differences. Accordingly, our study attempts to analyse the various learning strategies 
employed by firms as a response to different policy regimes. 
3 Industrial policy regimes in India and impact on firm learning 
Before proceeding, let us first describe the salient features of the major industrial policy 
regimes in India and their impact on production, markets and learning processes. As 
previously indicated, we identify three policy regimes, from which we derive associated 
hypotheses for testing. 
3.1 Protection regime (1970 to 1984): learning through absorptive capacity 
• Macroeconomic environment: Soon after independence, in 1953, the tariff 
commission’s recommendation for an indigenous manufacturing programme resulted 
in the ban on the import of fully built vehicles and an exit of foreign assemblers like 
Ford and General Motors. Automotive industry output was controlled by licensing 
production capacity and restricting output to single models, to minimise foreign 
exchange outflows due to component imports. Industrial policy did not allow capital 
imports or foreign direct investment (FDI). However, complicated rules on imports 
made access to technology difficult and slowed down the learning process of firms. 
• Market structure and technology: Market structure was concentrated, with entry 
barriers and restrictions to creating capacities and adding new product lines. By  
the early 1950s, indigenous business groups entered the industry with plans for 
production of passenger cars. The Birla group started Hindustan Motors through 
technical collaboration with the UK (Morris), and the Walchand group started 
Premier Automobiles through technical collaboration with Italy (Fiat). This was 
followed by the entry of Ashok Leyland (in collaboration with British Leyland)  
and (in collaboration with Germany’s Daimler Benz) the Tata Engineering and 
Locomotive Company – TELCO, later becoming Tata Motors Limited (TML)4 – for 
commercial vehicles, Standard Motors (in collaboration with Standard Motors, UK) 
for passenger cars, and Mahindra and Mahindra (in collaboration with Willys, USA) 
for Jeeps. 
During the period of protection and capacity restrictions, firms relied on licensed 
technology and foreign equity participation as the means to acquire technological 
capabilities. Product specific licensing policy forced companies to enter niche 
segments, where each enjoyed a monopoly. Restrictions on capacities were relaxed 
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in the mid-‘70s for the commercial vehicle industry, which was allowed unlimited 
production capacity and an automatic capacity expansion of 25% every five years. 
• External institutions: Supplier capabilities in India were not well developed, and 
Tata (hereafter TML) had various training programmes to develop its capabilities. 
Auto component manufacturing was reserved for small-scale industry; but lack  
of volume did not allow consolidation of capabilities at different levels of an 
appropriately organised supply chain (‘tierisation’); the supplier industry remained 
highly fragmented and technologically underdeveloped during this phase. 
• Impact on learning: Given the lack of well-developed technological capabilities, the 
Indian automobile industry relied heavily on technical collaborations. In the absence 
of major acquisitions or diversifications, firms with foreign equity grew faster than 
others because of the resource advantage they possessed (Narayanan, 1998). Further, 
in the presence of regulations on product lines, capacity expansions and restricted 
competition, firms did not have an incentive for major technological up-grading and 
new product development. However, there was incremental innovation and 
technological learning nonetheless, in the process of adapting products to local 
conditions. Thus, firms’ growth was dependent on absorptive capacity that enabled 
them to learn and to internalise foreign partners’ technological knowledge. 
Proposition 1 Protection encourages learning through internal resources. 
According to the infant-industry argument, in the initial phase of industrialisation, with 
limited technological capabilities, firm growth and learning is aided by a protectionist 
regime that encourages capacity building and acquisition of production and R&D 
capabilities. Hence, our first hypothesis (Proposition 1) is that protection promotes 
learning via internal resources. 
In the automobile industry, government regulations, by restricting competition and 
encouraging import substituting industrialisation, doubtless granted time for successful 
learners to build technological capabilities. However, uncertainty in demand and 
unreliability of suppliers encouraged high levels of vertical integration, even where assets 
were not highly specific [for example, by integrating into the machine tool industry, Tata 
could manufacture dies at 20% to 25% of what it costed to import them from Japan: see 
Kathuria, (1996), p.215]. The incidence of high vertical integration was not limited to the 
machine tool industry, but also more generalised products like forgings and castings (for 
instance, Ashok Leyland was prompted to vertically integrate into castings both to secure 
a critical input and to minimise on monitoring costs). 
3.2 Deregulation regime (1984 to 1991): learning through spillovers 
• Macroeconomic environment: The industrial policy statements of 1977 and 1980 
marked the beginning of deregulation, relaxing regulations governing production 
licenses, foreign collaboration, asset size and scope of industrial operations. In 1985, 
the policy of ‘broad-banding’ was introduced, allowing manufacturers to exploit 
economies of scale and scope by manufacturing several product lines. Technology 
imports were allowed and firms resorted to imports as a means to growth. 
Government entered into partnership with Suzuki in 1982 and in 1984, leading  
to the setting up of Maruti Udyog Limited (Maruti). However, the macroeconomic 
situation also deteriorated in the mid-‘80s because of liberalised imports, rupee 
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appreciation and a drain on foreign exchange reserves. The government was forced 
to devalue the currency in 1991 and resort to the IMF for liberalisation programme. 
Moreover, between 1984 and 1987, the yen appreciated 200 times against the dollar 
which hurt the Japanese joint ventures in India adversely as they could not support 
the rising cost of yen denominated imports of auto components from Japan. The 
entry of several Japanese automotive companies in the light commercial vehicle 
segment during 1985 to 1988 fragmented the industrial base, and the players could 
not survive in a low demand scenario against the backdrop of rising cost of 
importing components.5 
• Market structure: Maruti manufactured 12,000 vehicles challenging the market 
shares of the existing manufacturers, eventually becoming market leader in 1991. 
Entry in the passenger car segment was still restricted; Standard Motors had exited in 
the late 1980s, leaving three players until early 1991 – Maruti, Premier Automobiles 
Limited (PAL), and Hindustan Motors with market shares of 60%, 23% and 13%, 
respectively. Thus, market structure changed to favour the government joint venture 
Maruti Udyog Limited, while industry output increased by nearly 400%. The 
commercial vehicle segment was liberalised, and saw entry by Japanese joint 
ventures like DCM-Toyota, Eicher-Mitsubishi, Swaraj-Mazda and Allwyn-Nissan. 
However, most of them suffered set backs due to the macroeconomic environment 
and foreign exchange appreciation. 
• External institutions: The entry of Maruti also changed supplier relations within the 
industry, with the help of government sponsored training programmes and cluster 
building. The presence of Japanese joint ventures in the same region created 
economies of industrial agglomeration, and spread Japanese work practices  
relying on cooperative agreements between suppliers and OEMs. 
• Impact on learning: During the deregulation period firms relied on technology 
imports and growth through spillovers from new competitors. Allowing firms to 
invest in several product lines encouraged firm learning, as firms like Tata Motors 
introduced special purpose vehicles and platforms moving towards the passenger car 
segment. The institutional support for developing supplier capabilities led to flexible 
supplier relationships, whereby firms could adjust demand downwards through 
detailed cost negotiations. For instance, Maruti was also able to expand its press shop 
capacity from 130,000 to 180,000 units without any significant capital outlays by 
having flexible labour practices and joint ventures. 
Proposition 2 Deregulation encourages learning through spillovers and institutional 
support for supplier capabilities. 
The influence of external institutions can speed up learning and bring capabilities to the 
market, whether through government training programmes or the creation of clusters that 
encourage firms to adopt captive supplier relations to enable diffusion of capabilities. 
Hence, our second hypothesis (Proposition 2) that deregulation encourages learning via 
spillovers. 
The case of Maruti also demonstrates how supplier relations evolve from captive to 
relational approaches, when suppliers become partners in research and development. In 
the ‘80s and ‘90s, supplier development at Maruti involved inviting ‘quality gurus’ from 
Japan, with government collaboration. These consultants would form supplier clusters 
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and impart training on the principles of total quality management (TQM)/total preventive 
maintenance (TPM) and various other Japanese management practices. Some of the tier-1 
companies interviewed by the author (drawn from the sample of firms comprising the 
econometric study set) credited the OEM with exposing them to Japanese work practices 
via the cluster approach in the early ‘90s. 
3.3 Liberalisation regime (1992 to 2008): learning through innovation 
• Macroeconomic environment: In 1993, the passenger car industry was completely 
de-licensed. This was followed by entry by multinationals to this segment; existing 
firms were also encouraged to form joint ventures with foreign firms. The auto 
industry garnered 5.48% of total FDI approved between August 1991 and April 2002 
(Government of India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2002). 
• Market structure: Liberalised policies allowed firms to take advantage of low cost 
sourcing across the globe, giving rise to modular relationships between suppliers  
and OEMs. For example, Sona Koyo setup an engineering design and outsourcing 
company for its international clients, while Rico Auto and Sundaram fasteners have 
laboratories with the latest software for reverse engineering, designing and testing  
of parts. Such capabilities enable these firms to take up turnkey projects with low 
switching costs for the OEMs. At the same time, some firms did not acquire the 
capabilities to sustain competitiveness in the liberalised policy environment. For 
example, two firms exited the industry in the ‘90s: DCM Toyota, taken over by 
Daewoo, and PAL, which was taken over by Fiat after a partnership with Peugot 
failed. 
• External institutions: With severe infrastructural and supply bottlenecks, resulting 
partly from past government neglect and a policy of reserving components for the 
officially defined small-scale industries, manufacturers were compelled to encourage 
partnerships among their suppliers to reduce mutual vulnerability. Supplier 
associations were introduced by Japanese manufacturers to enable diffusion of best 
practices. The Automotive Component Manufacturers Association, an industrial 
lobby, actively pursued suppliers’ interests in the organised industry. 
• Impact on learning: The liberalised environment exposed firms to new competition, 
encouraging them to undertake R&D activities which increased during this time 
period. Firms introduced a variety of models; the time span between launches also 
declined rapidly, indicating that firms were actively involved in new product 
development. For example, at Tata Motors, a new technology group was setup  
at an engineering research centre (ERC) for simultaneous engineering and joint 
product development, involving suppliers. Thus, firms now resorted to learning 
through innovation and the spillovers resulting from inter-firm relations. Changing 
inter-firm relations can also involve setting up new organisational forms: in 1995, to 
promote technology acquisition in the component industry, Tata adopted a holding 
company structure to provide the flexibility to partner with multiple global majors to 
access cutting edge technology, facilitating the pooling of resources and capabilities, 
and creation of common infrastructure and managerial expertise. 
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Similarly, in 2004, Maruti started a ‘Centre for Excellence’, a joint investment with some 
of its tier-1 suppliers, with Maruti holding the majority stake. The centre promotes three 
kinds of activities through a cluster of companies: productivity improvements like TPM, 
Kaizen and training for Japanese production systems; quality improvement programmes, 
where a top-down approach is adopted emphasising the training principles of TQM; and 
system audits. 
Proposition 3 Liberalisation encourages learning through innovation and spillovers. 
The entry of multinationals made the industry more competitive as OEMs introduced 
newer models and acquired new technology through partnerships and investment in 
R&D. The trend indicates that R&D intensity (see Table 1) increased significantly during 
this period. For instance, Tata’s investment in R&D is one of the highest in the industry; 
its ERC has six divisions comprising styling, design, testing (in-door and out-door), 
vehicle performance, power train and machine shop. It hosts the only crash test facility 
and ‘hemi anechoic noise and vibration test chamber’6 in Asia outside Japan and Korea. 
It also has an advanced emission measurement system and a digital prototype laboratory. 
Table 1 R&D intensity (R&D exp as % of sales) 
 Tata 
Motors 
Ashok 
Leyland 
Hindustan 
Motors 
Maruti 
Udyog 
Ltd. 
Mahindra Premier automobiles 
Bajaj 
Tempo 
Hyundai 
Motor 
India Ltd. 
1990 0.7% 0.7% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2% 1.6% 0.6%  
1991 0.6% 1.1% 0.4% 0.4% 0.2% 1.3% 2.2%  
1992 1.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 2.0% 2.1%  
1993 2.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.3% 0.4% 1.2% 2.1%  
1994 2.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2% 0.8% 0.0% 1.9%  
1995 1.4% 0.9% 0.4% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7%  
1996 1.7% 0.1% 0.4% 0.2% 1.2% 3.5% 1.5%  
1997 2.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.2% 0.7% 0.3% 1.3%  
1998 1.6% 0.5% 0.7% 0.4% 0.9% 0.1% 1.6% 0.05% 
1999 1.2% 0.7% 0.0% 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 1.0% 0.02% 
2000 1.1% 0.9% 0.3% 0.5% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 
2001 1.1% 0.9% 0.5% 0.5% 1.8% 0.0% 2.2% 0.0% 
2002 1.3% 1.0% 0.6% 0.2% 1.7%  2.3% 0.10% 
More generally, firms like Tata Motors and Maruti entered into strategic partnerships, 
evolving new forms of supplier relations to promote joint product development and 
learning. For example, in the liberalised regime, Tata’s technology strategy focused on 
acquiring strategic partnerships and import of technological know-how [importing 
technology for developing fuel injected gasoline engines from AVL (Austria), for body 
styling from IDEA (Italy), for welding processes from HLS (Germany), and for engine 
testing from Le Moteur Moderne (France), in 1992]. In 1994, the machine tool division 
built robots for the first time, with technology imported from Nachi-Fujikashi of Japan. 
Tata entered the passenger car segment in 1998 and in 2000; in an effort to focus on its 
core business of vehicle design and development it hived off the machine tool division 
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into a separate company called Tata Automation Limited (TAL). Hence, our third 
proposition is that liberalisation encourages learning through innovation and spillovers. 
4 Learning model based on time path of growth 
In this section, we now consider the formal model and its empirical estimation. 
4.1 Formal model 
The present study adopts the learning model proposed by Geroski and Mazzucato (2002) 
which attempts to understand the role of learning in explaining the pattern of inter-firm 
growth rates. As previously noted, while learning is attributed to various factors, it is not 
directly observable. What is observable is the consequence of learning whose time series 
behaviour can be analysed to explain the type of learning employed by the firm: this is 
because different types of learning will generate different time series patterns of the 
output indicator. As observed, learning can take place in many ways: through learning by 
doing, internal resources or absorptive capacity, spillovers or research and development. 
The Geroski-Mazzucato model nests several hypotheses about learning into a generalised 
model, the null hypothesis being that learning is an unsystematic or stochastic process. 
Starting with a production function on the lines of the simple AK model, output can 
be modelled as a function of capital or stock of knowledge (K), and all other inputs (A). 
Learning is defined as the rate of change in the stock of knowledge (K) over time. 
Performance of the firm is captured by the firm’s growth rate, which is the output 
indicator of the learning process. In the absence of a direct measure of labour 
productivity, the impact of productivity is assumed to be an idiosyncratic shock and a 
stochastic process, included in A(t).7 
The purpose of using this simplified model is two-fold: 
1 the choice variables of a profit maximising firm are affected by learning and 
therefore a direct relation between stock of knowledge (or capital) and output rates is 
observable 
2 the model can be treated as a basic version in which labour productivity and R&D 
can be added later to refine the results further. 
Define a production function 
Q(t) A(t)KN(t)α=  (1) 
where Q(t) is output produced; KN(t) is the firm’s stock of knowledge; and A(t) is the 
effect of all other inputs on the output. Taking logs and first differencing: 
log Q(t) log A(t) log KN(t)Δ = Δ +αΔ  (2) 
where ΔlogQ(t) is the growth rate of the firm; ΔlogKN(t) is the rate of growth of the 
stock of capital, which is also, by definition, learning LE(t). 
The model starts with the simplest of learning assumptions – unsystematic or 
stochastic learning. Learning in this case is defined as: 
LE(t) (t)= ξ  (3) 
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where ξ(t) is an i.i.d. random variable with mean zero and constant variance. In this case, 
( )log Q(t) (t) (t) v(t)Δ = ξ + ε =  (4) 
which implies that firm size follows a random walk, as per Gibrat’s law. This 
specification serves as the null hypothesis for the model of learning. 
The second type of learning is learning through internal resources or absorptive 
capacity, which is the set of the firm’s entire pre-existing knowledge and experience. In 
this case, the firm’s current/future growth is dependent on past learning or absorptive 
capacity, thus, generating a relationship between the firm’s current growth rate and its 
lagged growth rate. Since learning LE(t) is defined as change in capital stock 
(ΔlogKN(t)), this suggests that the rate of growth of the firm’s capital stock (or 
knowledge) depends on its level (reflected in a lagged output variable) as well as any 
recent increase in that stock (reflected in a lagged growth of output). 
LE(t) log KN(t 1) LE(t 1) (t)= δ − + θ − + ξ  (5) 
This implies that, 
tlog Q(t) log Q(t 1) log Q(t 1)Δ = ρ − +ψΔ − +μ  (6) 
where μ(t) = ε(t) + α * θ * ε (t – 1) + α * δ * logA(t – 1), and ρ = α2δ and ψ = α * θ. 
The coefficient of absorptive capacity ‘ρ’ here reflects the increasing returns to 
knowledge accumulation. If this coefficient is less than zero, decreasing returns to 
knowledge accumulation prevail and knowledge will gradually depreciate over time. If 
the coefficient is greater than zero, increasing returns to knowledge accumulation prevail 
and learning becomes easier the larger the current stock of knowledge. The sign of this 
coefficient in turn depends on the industry structure and the nature of the industry 
appropriability conditions, which are not discussed in the model.8 
The third type of learning is through spillovers, whereby firm growth rate is affected 
by competitors’ R&D activities. Since these activities get reflected in firm output, one 
can posit a relation between the growth rate of the firm and its rival firm. 
j jLE(t) log KN (t 1) (t)= α Δ − + ξ  (7) 
This implies that, 
j jlog Q(t) log Q (t 1) v(t)Δ = λ Δ − +  (8) 
where λj = ααj. 
Substituting for LE(t), from equations (4), (6) and (8), in the production function, we 
get the following equation incorporating learning through internal resources, spillovers 
and unsystematic learning: 
1 2 3 j
4 j t
log Q(t) log KN(t) log KN(t 1) log KN (t)
log KN (t 1)
Δ +α Δ +α Δ − +α Δ
+α Δ − + ε  (9) 
The different types of learning are summarised in Table 2. The presence of a specific type 
of learning is indicated by the significance of the coefficient representing the learning 
type in question. For example, when α3 = α4 = 0, the model reduces to learning via 
internal resources; when α1 = α2 = α3 = 0, the model shows significant learning from 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    Learning across policy regimes 11    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
output spillovers; and finally when there does not exist any systematic pattern of learning, 
none of the coefficients are significant, except for the lagged output coefficient. 
Table 2 Summary of models of learning 
 Model Specification Authors 
Unsystematic learning LE(t) = ξ(t) 1 
 Gibrat’s law ΔLogQ(t)= ξ(t) + εt 
Sutton 
(1997) 
Learning by innovation LE(t) = βI(t) + ξ(t), β > 0 2 
 Learning can be tied to the 
appearance of a particular 
innovation or R&D 
ΔLog Q(t) = αβI(t) + v(t) 
Grilliches 
(1979) 
Learning through spillovers LE(t) = αjΔLogKNj(t – 1)+ ξ(t) 3 
 Relationship between the 
growth rate of firms i in 
period t and that of its rivals 
in t – 1. 
ΔLogQ(t) = λjΔLog Qj(t – 1) + v(t), where 
λ = ααj 
Grilliches 
(1979, 
1992) 
Leaning by doing LE(t) = ϕ Log X(t) + ξ(t) 
X(t) = ΣtQ(τ) 
4 
 Experience and focus on 
cumulative production ΔLogQ(t) = αφLog X(t) + v(t) 
Spence 
(1981) 
Learning using internal 
resources 
LE(t) = δLogKN(t – 1) + θLE(t – 1) + ξ(t) 
∆LogQ(t) = ρLogQ(t – 1) + ψΔLogQ(t – 1) 
+ μ(t) 
5 
 Link between stock of 
knowledge maintained by 
firm today and tomorrow. 
where μ(t) = ε(t) + αθε(t – 1)  
+ αδLogA(t – 1), ρ = α2δ and ψ = αθ 
Evans 
(1987), 
Geroski 
et al. 
(2001) 
4.2 Empirical estimation 
In light of the above discussion of the model of learning and the three propositions, the 
study performs a panel data analysis to estimate the model using sample data on the 
growth of firms. The data variables include number of vehicles produced. The 
explanatory variables are lagged output, lagged growth of output, lagged output of other 
firms and lagged growth in output of other firms. While the first two variables capture 
learning through internal resources, the latter two capture spillovers. The Hausman test 
shows that this test statistic is significant at the 7% level, indicating that the random 
effects model can be employed for analysis. The estimation is done for the base model 
followed by two representations of the model that capture the impact of the time trend 
and the policy regime. The estimation procedure is discussed below. 
The base model is tested for the entire dataset of 13 firms and 38 time periods, 
without introducing the impact of regime specific effects. It is represented as follows: 
it 0 0 it 1 it 1 2 jt 1 3 it 1 4 jt 1 tY X X X X X .− − − −= α +β +β +β +β Δ +β Δ + ε  (10) 
The dependent variable Yit is the growth rate of firm i; and the independent variables are 
the following: Xit = output of the firm; Xit–1 = lagged output of firm, and Xjt–1 = lagged 
output of rival firms/industry, where the subscripts i and j denote own firm and rival  
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firm output respectively. Similarly, ΔXit–1 = lagged growth rate of own firm, and  
ΔXjt–1 = lagged growth rate of rival firms/industry. Rival firm output is the industry 
output minus the own firm output. 
In the second representation of the model, regime specific dummies and a time trend 
are introduced to identify the impact of regime changes on the growth of the firms. 
Regime specific dummies are interacted with the time trend to get the slope coefficients. 
3
it 0 0 it 1 it 1 2 jt 1 3 it 1 4 jt 1 k k itk 1
Y X X X X X D * t− − − − == α +β +β +β +β Δ +β Δ + γ + ε∑  (11) 
All variables are similar to the base model except for the interaction terms between 
regime dummies (D) and time trend t, where k represents Regimes 1 to 3. The third and 
full specification includes interaction of structural dummies with all explanatory variables 
including time trend. 
Data source: The analysis presented in this section is based on annual production data 
for a sample of 13 firms in the four-wheeler automobile industry, obtained from the 
Society of Indian Automotive Manufacturers (SIAM, 2004) and Automobile Component 
Manufacturers Association. The data relates to a 38 year time period from 1970 to 2008, 
and is subdivided into three industrial policy regimes eras: protection (1970 to 1984); 
deregulation (1985 to 1991) and liberalisation (1992 to 2008). The 13 firms in the  
four-wheeler segment can be broadly divided into three groups: group one is those born 
in the protection period (pre-1970); group two those born in the post-regulatory period 
(post-1985); and a third group is the multinational firms which entered after 1996. The 
data is unbalanced with exit and entry in the liberalised regime. The means of the 
explanatory variables are presented in Table 3, as well as information on sample size. 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics 
Production 
(units) 
Growth (log 
differences) 
Lagged 
output 
(log) 
Lagged output 
(log)-rival 
firms 
Lagged 
growth-rival 
firms 
 
Variables/firms 
Average Average Average Average Average 
Sample 
size 
1 Tata Motors       
  Regime 1 383,921 0.143 11.377 12.339 0.116 13 
  Regime 2 272,754 0.160 8.075 8.755 0.111 7 
  Regime 3 343,366 0.113 11.240 12.237 0.115 17 
2 Ashok Leyl       
  Regime 1 10,831 0.085 9.144 11.526 0.042 13 
  Regime 2 19,875 0.074 9.805 12.534 0.125 7 
  Regime 3 43,356 0.047 10.546 13.629 0.102 17 
3 Hind. motors       
  Regime 1 23,173 –0.002 10.020 11.383 0.056 13 
  Regime 2 26,158 –0.068 10.224 12.497 0.137 7 
  Regime 3 22,004 –0.036 9.978 13.643 0.105 17 
4 Mahindras       
  Regime 1 28,019 0.073 10.075 11.372 0.036 13 
  Regime 2 58,227 0.028 10.937 12.383 0.141 7 
  Regime 3 138,516 0.072 11.726 13.514 0.105 17 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics (continued) 
Production 
(units) 
Growth (log 
differences) 
Lagged 
output 
(log) 
Lagged output 
(log)-rival 
firms 
Lagged 
growth-rival 
firms 
 
Variables/firms 
Average Average Average Average Average 
Sample 
size 
5 Premier auto       
  Regime 1 18,811 0.040 9.771 11.440 0.049 13 
  Regime 2 35,312 0.017 10.442 12.473 0.127 7 
  Regime 3 14,032 52.035 51.341 13.656 0.108 8 
6 Bajaj Tempo       
  Regime 1 7,276 0.109 8.695 11.561 0.041 13 
  Regime 2 15,138 0.010 9.611 12.545 0.127 7 
  Regime 3 19,860 0.004 9.788 13.650 0.103 17 
7 Eicher       
  Regime 2 3,745 28.473 34.060 12.590 0.121 6 
  Regime 3 12,524 0.088 9.089 13.664 0.101 17 
8 Swaraj       
  Regime 2 3,093 14.186 21.031 12.589 0.121 7 
  Regime 3 6,290 64.016 61.606 13.671 0.101 6 
9 DCM       
  Regime 2 2,502 14.272 20.769 12.591 0.121 7 
  Regime 3 6,564 0.072 8.562 13.668 0.101 17 
10 Maruti       
  Regime 2 98,865 0.241 11.223 12.282 0.069 7 
  Regime 3 415,556 0.109 12.717 13.184 0.097 17 
11 Hyundai India       
  Regime 3 202,363 35.713 47.692 13.599 0.090 11 
12 Ford India       
  Regime 3 24,258 47.188 57.084 13.667 0.100 9 
13 Toyota Kirl.       
  Regime 3 36,477 41.397 52.030 13.661 0.099 10 
 Industry       
  Regime 1 122,617 0.057    13 
  Regime 2 326,894 0.085    7 
  Regime 3 1,101,079 0.103    17 
Table 4, on compound annual average growth rates (CAGR), shows different results for 
the different policy regimes. Growth rates of the six firms in the protection phase  
were higher compared to the liberalisation period. In the sample of six firms, only one 
firm – Tata Motors – did better during liberalisation as compared to protection; under 
liberalisation, multinational firms had the highest growth rates. To summarise, Regime 1 
(protection) was driven by growth in the commercial vehicle segment, with firms like 
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Ashok Leyland, Tata, Mahindra and Bajaj Tempo displaying above average industry 
growth rates. Regime 2 (deregulation) and Regime 3 (liberalisation) were driven by 
growth in the passenger car segment, with the entry of Maruti in 1985 and multinational 
players in mid 1990s. Overall, industrial growth has been highest during liberalisation, 
the main drivers being multinational firms in the passenger car sector. 
One can estimate using either random effect or fixed effect models. The former 
assumes that firm-specific factors are uncorrelated with size and age; the latter allows for 
such a correlation. The Hausman statistic, noted above, can help choose the method of 
estimation: it tests the null hypothesis of no correlation (i.e., a random effect model). 
Based on the results for this statistic, as described above, the study uses a one-way 
random effects model to estimate coefficients. 
Expected coefficient signs (Table 5): Unsystematic learning induces a random walk in 
firm size; and learning from internal resources creates a correlation between the growth 
of a particular firm and its lagged output and lagged output growth. The coefficient on 
lagged output represents the previous stock of knowledge a firm possesses. The 
coefficient on lagged output growth represents the learning effect, or the speed of 
knowledge assimilation. A negative relation between lagged output and firm growth 
means that there are diminishing returns to the stock of knowledge a firm possesses. A 
negative coefficient for lagged output growth on the other hand means that there are 
diminishing returns to growth. Both of these imply that differences in firm performances 
gradually diminish and firm sizes converge to a mean. There could be diminishing returns 
to the stock of knowledge a firm possesses but increasing returns to its growth or the 
speed with which the firm accumulates knowledge. In this case, a firm’s learning ability 
is more important than the stock of knowledge it possesses in determining its growth 
performance. 
In the protection period (1970 to 1984), there were restrictions on capacity expansion 
and imports of capital goods. Hence, output growth was constrained by the regulatory 
environment. Therefore, one would expect diminishing returns to the accumulation of 
capital stock (a proxy for knowledge). However, one would expect increasing returns to 
the rate of growth of output because of learning by doing, incremental innovations and 
adaptations of technology to local conditions. 
In the partial deregulation period, relaxation in norms for capacity expansion and FDI 
coupled with institutional support for capability building among the component 
manufacturers would have resulted in increased knowledge flows and greater spillovers. 
The policy of broad-banding also allowed firms to exploit economies of scope and scale. 
Hence, the returns from the stock of knowledge as well as its growth (own as well as rival 
firms) would be positive. In terms of the model, the coefficients on lagged output/growth 
should be positive. 
In the liberalised policy regime, speed of knowledge accumulation rather than access 
to knowledge could be more important, with a level playing field for all the players. 
Hence, one can expect a negative coefficient for lagged output but a positive coefficient 
on returns to a firm’s own growth. Spillovers of rival firms may have a positive impact 
on the growth of firms, but higher returns to learning of rival firms may have a negative 
impact as rival firms get a higher market share. 
In the following section, and in Table 6, the results from the estimation exercise are 
presented. 
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Table 4 Compound average growth rate 
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Table 5 Expected coefficient signs 
Variable R I R II R III 
Lagged growth rate (+) (+) (–) 
Lagged output (–) (+) (+) 
Lagged output-rival firms (+) (+) (+) 
Lagged growth-rival firms (+) (+) (–) 
4.3 Results 
In column 1 of Table 6, the results for fixed effects are presented. The coefficient on 
lagged output is positive but not significant. Lagged growth in output is positive and 
significant: a 1% increase in lagged growth results in a 0.16% increase in current growth. 
This indicates that for the entire time period of 38 years, the stock of knowledge is not an 
important variable for explaining inter-firm growth differentials; rather, the speed of 
knowledge assimilation or the growth of output is a significant determinant of firm 
growth. The coefficient on lagged output of rival firms is negative and significant, 
implying diminishing returns to rival firms’ stock of knowledge: a 1% increase in rival 
firms’ output results in a 0.09% decrease in firm’s growth. In terms of learning, there are 
increasing returns to the stock of knowledge possessed by firms, as well as their ability to 
assimilate this knowledge. The coefficient on lagged output of rival firms is negative but 
lagged growth of rival firms is positive for the overall model, suggesting that returns to 
spillovers were diminishing but there are increasing returns to the speed of assimilation 
of rival firm innovation. 
The Hausman test statistic was not significant at the 5% level, supporting the null 
hypothesis of zero correlation between error terms and explanatory variables. Hence, a 
random effects model is more appropriate for this dataset. Col. 2 reports the results of 
one-way random effects model; the only difference to emerge is that the constant term 
turns out to be positive and significant.9 
In column 3, interaction terms for time trend and regime dummies are introduced. 
The coefficient on lagged growth is positive and significant. The coefficient signs for 
lagged output of rival firms and lagged growth of rival firms in the second model are 
similar to the base model, suggesting that more than the stock of knowledge, the speed of 
assimilation or learning is an important determinant of growth. The coefficient on the 
time trend is positive and significant for deregulation and liberalisation, indicating that 
growth was much higher in these periods when compared to the protection period. 
Lagged variables in a dataset generally result in non-stationarity and unit root problems. 
Here, the significant coefficient for time trend indicates that variables are trend stationary 
with structural breaks. Incorporating structural dummies with the time trend takes care of 
the unit root problem. 
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Table 6 Panel data estimation 
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Column 4 presents regime specific slope coefficients which highlight the different 
learning strategies across the three regimes. Structural dummies representing the three 
policy regimes are interacted with the explanatory variables to arrive at regime-specific 
slope coefficients. Regime 1 (protection) is taken as the base category against which the 
results for other two regimes are compared. The results show a negative coefficient on 
lagged output and on lagged growth in Regime 1: The negative size effect indicates that 
smaller plants grew faster than larger ones in the protection period. In Regime 2 
(deregulation), the results are opposite, but not significant. In Regime 3 (liberalisation), 
both the coefficients are positive suggesting increasing returns to the stock of knowledge 
as well as from the speed of accumulation of that knowledge. 
Table 7 Learning strategies across policy regimes 
Regime 1  Regime 2 
Internal 
resources Spillovers Unsystematic 
 Internal 
resources Spillovers Unsystematic 
√    √ √  
Regime 3 
Internal resources Spillovers Unsystematic 
√ √  
The finding supports Proposition 1 – that protection encourages growth through internal 
resources. In Regime 1, lagged output was significant but negative, implying that returns 
to knowledge accumulation were decreasing. A negative and significant coefficient on 
lagged growth of rival firms indicates that there were decreasing returns to the speed of 
assimilation of rival firm innovation. 
In Regime 2 (deregulation), lagged output is negative but not significantly different 
from Regime 1 (base category). Similarly, the coefficient on lagged growth of rival firms 
is positive but not significant. This implies that rival firms’ learning had a positive 
spillover effect on the growth of firms during deregulation but not significantly different 
from protection, thus lending support to Proposition 2 on the positive impact of 
spillovers. 
The results therefore also support the proposition – Proposition 3 – that during the 
liberalisation period, firms grew through innovation and spillovers as the coefficient signs 
on lagged output, and rival firms growth are all positive and significant, indicative of 
positive impact of stock of knowledge as well as the speed of knowledge accumulation. 
In terms of the model, this would imply that there was substantial learning from 
spillovers in Regimes 1 and 3, and most so in Regime 3. The learning strategies 
employed by firms in different policy regimes are summarised in Table 7. 
5 Conclusions 
This paper undertakes a study of growth in the Indian automobile industry under three 
policy regimes, focusing on learning and capability acquisition. While the literature on 
technological capability acquisition is rich in documenting the empirical details of the 
process and sequence of capability acquisition, it suffers from subjective classification of 
capabilities and a static analysis of capabilities that are changing over time. The study 
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integrates empirical case studies with the literature on learning, and applies a dynamic 
model of learning. It examines the dynamic nature of the learning process by looking at 
the time path of output across firms. An econometric model is estimated for the Indian 
industry for a sample of 13 four-wheeler firms across three policy regimes, reflecting the 
history of the sector. It uses random effects panel data estimation, with time trend and 
structural dummies as shift variables for the regime changes. 
To conclude, the paper demonstrates that learning varies by policy regime. Learning 
is also firm-specific, defined by the technology strategy and capabilities of firms, which 
are not captured by the traditional industrial organisation theory. The study rejects the 
hypothesis of independence between firm size and firm growth (Gibrat’s law). However, 
results indicate that the relation between firm size and growth differs by policy regime. 
The results indicate that during protection accumulation of stock of knowledge is more 
important, whereas during liberalisation the speed of knowledge accumulation becomes 
key. From a policy perspective, while protection encourages acquisition of production 
capabilities, it does not equip the firm with the learning capabilities necessary for survival 
in a competitive environment. This is shown by the fact that some of the firms which 
acquired learning also exited the industry in a liberalised policy regime, unable to face 
the competition. What is required is an ability to adapt to changing market conditions. 
These conclusions give pointers to further research, to incorporate the impact of quality 
and coordination capabilities in the model of learning. 
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Notes 
1 The resource-based perspective of the firm (see Penrose, 1959, 1995) recognised the role of 
various ongoing learning processes, thus laying foundations for the later evolutionary and 
capabilities view of a firm defined in terms of the knowledge production function. Knowledge 
is ‘distributed’ in that it is not possessed by a single agent and requires qualitative 
coordination: this in turn is the source of differential capabilities and firm heterogeneity. The 
existence of tacit and distributed knowledge implies that there are learning costs for firms, 
which in turn determine its performance and boundaries. These learning costs are the costs of 
persuading, negotiating and coordinating with, and teaching, others, and are termed ‘DTC’. 
They arise in the face of change, notably technological and organisational innovation 
(Langlois, 1992). 
2 Gibrat’s finding, related to the independence between firm growth and size, has been tested in 
various industries with mixed results (see, for example, Evans, 1987; Dunne et al., 1989; 
Shanmugam and Bhaduri, 2002). 
3 Sanjay (1996) highlights the strategies of various four-wheel manufacturers in acquiring 
‘know-how’ (production) and ‘know-why’ (R&D) capabilities under various policy regimes. 
D’Costa (2004) studies the emergence of flexible governance forms in the Indian automotive 
industry which facilitated the transfer of best practices, again in the context of different 
industrial policy regimes. 
4 The rechristening of TELCO as TML occurred in 2003. The company will be referred to as 
TML in the remainder of the paper. 
5 Several leading firms including Toyota, Nissan, Mazda and Mitsubishi were setup as joint 
ventures to produce light commercial vehicles during the mid-1980s but exited the industry in 
the early 1990s because of rising input costs and low demand. The feasibility of Japanese joint 
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venture projects for light commercial vehicles was done at 260 yen to the dollar which rose to 
100 yen to the dollar (D’Costa, 1998). 
6 Anechoic Chambers are echo-free enclosures with a high sound energy absorption level of 
99% to 100%. Hemi-anechoic chambers – used for testing heavy equipment like  
automobiles – have acoustical treatment on the walls and ceiling only and feature hard floors 
with no acoustical treatment. 
7 The model further assumes that the evolution of A(t) is a white noise process, driven by a 
large number of small idiosyncratic cost and demand shocks, and that the variance of A(t), and 
of α, the elasticity of output with respect to knowledge, is similar across firms. 
8 Industry appropriability conditions refers to the extent to which firms capture the benefits 
from their innovative activity (measured by R&D effort) and the degree to which valuable 
knowledge spills over in the public domain. Spillovers are in turn determined by the degree of 
competition in the industry. As firms’ learning is influenced by their R&D effort, Cohen and 
Levinthal (1990) model absorptive capacity in terms of firm’s R&D intensity, as determined 
by demand, industry appropriability and technological opportunity conditions. 
9 The constant term is significant for all firms in Regime 3, reflecting the role of other factors 
like demand. 
